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IN THE SUPREME COU.RT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
~lAUDE

BAKER,

Plaintiff and Resp ovndent,
1

vs.

Case No.
7239

L. JANSEN, doing business as UTAH
HOUSE CLEANING CO·MPANY,

Defendant 01nd A ppell(Jf}'l)t.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

~STATEMENT

O·F FACTS

Plaintiff, in addition to the Statement of Facts set
forth in appellant's brief, submits the following facts:
The plaintiff and respondent in this action is a
woman 71 years of age (Tr. p. 107). There is conflict
in the evidence as to the condition of the hall way on the
n1orning of the accident. The defendant claims that
the hallway was blocked off so that no one could go
through the passageway without climbing over the obstruction or moving them (Tr. 'P'P· 123, 132, 139). DeSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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fendant introduced photographic exhibits 1 through 4
as illustrative of the condition of the hall at the time of
the accident. These photographs were taken approximately a week before the trial ( Tr. pp. 116-120). Plaintiff's testimony tells a different story as to the condition
of the hall and according to her evidence and that of
her son, w}1.o entered the building immediately after the
accident, no such blockade existed and there was plenty
of room to walk down the hall (Tr. pp. 96, 100, 191).
The plaintiff does not remember observing a;ny burning
light ~anging from an extension cord directly above the
table ( Tr. p. 9'7). There is also conflict in the evidence
regarding the position of the drop cloth or canvas used
by the defendant, the defendant stating that the canvas
had :been folded neatly and placed under the table out
of the way (Tr. pp. 113, 114). Plaintiff's testimony indicates the drop cloth extended into the passageway in
the hall and was ruffled and uneven (Tr. pp. 95, 190).

ARGU·MEN·T
Plaintiff's argument will be divided under the following headings :
1. The court was correct in overruling defendent
L. Jansen's general demurrer to plaintiff's amended
compJaint.
2. The defendant L. Jansen, or his employees, were
guilty of negligence.
3. The doctrine of assumption of risk is not applicable in this case.
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4.

The plaintiff was not guilt of contributory neg-

ligence as a matter of law.
5.

The trial court correctly instructed the jury as

to the theory and law of the case.
6.

The trial court did not err in giving instruction

Number 4, nor did the court err in instructing the jury
orally and then striking a part thereof from said written
instruction.

1. THE CO·URT WAS CORRECT IN OVERR.ULING DEFENDANT L. JAN·SEN'S GENERAL
DE~fURRER TO PLAINTIFF'S AlYfENDED
CO~IPLAINT.

Plaintiff alleged in her amended complaint that she
was a tenant in the apartment house where Jan sen was
performing certain work and services; that the defendant in performing such services negligently laid or permitted the cloth and covering on the floor to become
ruffled and uneven so that people traversing said hallway might catch their feet in the same and fall; that he
permitted his tools to be strewn in the hallway so that
it would be a hazard to the people. walking down said
hallway; that he failed to notify individuals using the
hall that they should not walk along said passageway,
and that he failed to place any barricade to warn people
not to walk along said passageway. From these facts
it is clear that plaintiff was entitled to use said halhvay,
and that the defendant owed a duty to her and the other
tenants of the apartment house to keep the hallway in
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such a condition that it could be traversed in safety or
to have blocked the same off so that it could not be used.
Plaintiff further alleges in her amended complaint,
that by reason of the negligent acts of defendant, and
she being unaware that the hallway should not be used,
she proceeded along the same, caught her foot in the
cloth, stumbled and was injured. As the court has stated
in the case of Soule v. W e~atherby, et al., 39 Utah 580,
118 P ac. 833 :

''* * * * It is fundamental that, in order to
state a good cause of action in any kind of a case,
it must be made to appear from the face of the
complaint, either by direct allegation or by necessary or unavoidable inference from the facts
stated, that there is a primary legal right in the
plaintiff, a primary legal duty connected with
such right resting on the defendant, and a breach
of such duty. When these allegations are supplemented by a statement of the amount claimed and
a prayer for judgment, which are formal matters
merely, a complete cause as well as right of action
is stated upon which the plaintiff is entitled to
relief in accordance with the rules of practice
and the substantive law relating to the subjectmatter.''
The plain tiff in this case· has elearly come within these
rules.
Defendant states in his brief at page 10 thereof:
"If the complaint could be construed to allege a hazardous condition, plaintiff cannot he
heard to say that she was unaware of such conSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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dition 'Yhen it Y\~as open and obvious, and she does
not allege facts sho"yinp: a reason for her inability
to observe.it. It is further apparent that plaintiff
did not have to subject herself to the alleged
hazard, for, as she states, there was a stairway
leading to the first floor at each end of the hallway and plaintiff does not allege that. the hallway was hazardous in all of the directions available to her.''
By the above statement defendant has tried to place
a strained interpretation upon plaintiff's amended complaint, but even under defendant's construction the complaint states a cause of action and does not show contributory negligence as a Inatter of law. In the case
of M~oore v. Miles, 108 Utah 167, 158 Pac. (2d) 676, this
Court held that the question of contributory negligence
was properly submitted to the jury. In the Miles case
plaintiff testified that the west end of the hall was so
dark that she could not see the stairs and that as she
was walking slowly and feeling ahead with her feet
she lost her balance at the first step and fell down the
short flight of steps to the doorway. In the Miles case
there was also another stairway which could have been
used. The Court in this regard stated:
''But defendant argues that since plaintiff
had a choice of going do\vn the stairway into the
lobby, which admittedly was well lighted, or do\vn
the west stairway, to the parking lot which plaintiff testified was dark, she was negligent-"- as a
matter of law because she chose the unsafe
route."
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"A similar situation was presented to the
court in Williams v. City of New York, 214 N.Y.
259, 108 N.E. 448, 449, and it was there said:
'Another point urged against the plaintiff
grows out of his conduct on the occasion of the
accident. He had slipped down on the sidewalk
just before he fell the second time and broke his
leg. He pursued his way along the icy sidewalk
instead of crossing the street to a sidewalk which
was entirely clear. This, it is said, was contributory negligence, not merely justifying, but requiring, the nonsuit. It may have been contributory negligence, as a matter of fact, but we think
it was a question for the jury. In Twogood v.
May·or etc., of New Y~ork, 102 N. Y. 216, 6 N.. E.
275, it was held to be a question for the jury
whether a plaintiff was chargeable with contributory negligence in venturing upon a walk in an
icy condition 'vhen she might have avoided all
danger by going upon the walk on the other side
of the street which was clear and safe.'
In the face of such facts, the court still held
in the Williams case that the question of contributory negligence was for the jury. A similar case
is Tillotson v. City of Davenport, 232 Iowa 44, 4
N.W. 2d 365, 366, where the court likewise held
that the question of contributory negligence 'vas
for the jury. The court said:
'It is well settled that mere knowledge that
a walk is dangerous, unsafe for travel, is not
sufficient to establish contributory negligence
though there is another way that is safe and convenient, and to defeat recovery it must appear
that the traveler knew or as an ordinarily cautious person should have known that it was jmp-rudent .to use the walk. Templin v. City of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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B·oone, 127 Io,va 91, 102 N.W. 789; Reynolds v.
City of Centerville, 151 Iowa 19, 129 N.W. 949;
Gibson Y. City of DeniS'on, 153 Iowa 320, 133 N.W.
712, 38 L.R.A., N.S., 644; Travers v. City of Emmetsburg, 190 Io,va 717, 180 N.vV. 753; Lundy v.
City of Ames, 202 Iowa 100, 209 N.W. 427; Franks
v. Sioux City, 229 Iowa 1097, 296 N.W. 224.'
In view of the foregoing authorities, and the
long est~blished rule in this jurisdiction, that contributory negligence is a question for a jury, we
hold that the issue of contributory negligence 'vas
properly submitted to the jury by the trial court.''
The condition of the hallway, to the plaintiff in the
case at bar, was not more apparent than the darkness
of the hall in the Miles case, or the ice on the sidewalk
in the Williams case, nor is it the duty of plain tiff to
negative contributory negligence in her pleading.
2. THE DEFENDANT L. JANS~N, OR HIS. EMPLOYEES, WERE GUILTY OF NEGLIGENCE.
The defendant was bound to use ordinary care in
conducting his work to p·revent injury from occurring
to the plaintiff. Plaintiff as a tenant had a right to the
access of this hallway and it was the defendant's duty
to either close off the area in which he was working
or to keep the passage reasonably safe for the plaintiff
while she was using the hall.
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The test of the defendant's liability for such negligence is set out in Furkovich v. Bingham Coal & Lumber

Co., 45 Utah 89, 143 Pac. 121:
" 'But the test of liability is not "'-hether, by
the exercise of ordinary prudence, the defendant could or eould not have foreseen the precise
form in which the injury actually resulted, hut
he must be held for anything which, after
the injury is complete, appears to have been a
natural and probable consequence of his act. If
the act is one which the party, in the exercise of
ordinary care, could have anticipated as likely
to result in injury, then he is liable for any Injury actually resulting from it, althou~h he could
not have anticipated the particular injury "\vhich
did occur.' ''
The court further states :
''Where a dangerous condition is easily obviated or rendered harmless, a failure to do one
or the other may be considered in determining
the question of negligence.''
In this case defendant Jansen could have seen that
the drop cloth was smoothly laid so that people traversing the hall would not cat~h their heels, or that his
equipment was properly out of the way, or he could have
completely blocked off the hall so that the same could
not have been used by the tenants. The defendant is
answerable for any foreseeable injury that might occur
to tenants using the hallway as a result of the placing
of equiprnent, in failing to keep the drop cloth properly
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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laid so that it would not becon1e ruffled and uneven, or
in failing to take ordinary prec.autions to keep the
tenants from using the particular area. The trial court
clearly instructed the jury upon this point in its instruction Number 5 (Tr. p. 32).
The conflict of evidence as to whether or not the
defendant did in fact barricade the hallway and placH
his equipment as he clain1s, or whether the passageway
'vas left open and the drop cloth or canva.s was permitted to extend into the hall in an improper and dangerous condition was properly submitted to the jury and
they, as the triers of the fact, believed the plaintiff, and
this finding becomes the ultimate fact in this case.
3. THE DOCTRINE O·F ASSUMPTION OF R,ISK
IS NOT APPLICABLE IN THIS CA,SE.
As a general rule the doctrine of assumption of
risk is not applicable in a case arising from a tort, but
is applied in cases of contract and, particularly, under
the W orkmens' Compensation Act. This doctrine is well
stated in the case of Horne v. Neill, 70 Georgia Appeals,
602, 29 S.E. 2d 275, wherein the court states as follows:
''This court held in Brown v. Rome Machine
& Fioundry C'o., 5 Ga. App. 142, 152, 62 S.E. 720,
725: 'We hope that we have made it clear that
assumption of risk is a defense which arises only
from the contract that creates the 1·elationship
essential to the duty upon the breach of \vhich
the plaintiff's cause of action rests. Theoretically speaking, contributory negligence has no
different meaning in actions by the servant
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against the master from that which it universally
has in suits based on torts. These foundations of
liability and of defense, when reduced to final
analysis, are but phases of well-recognized cornmon-law principles. If we bear in rnind that assumption of risk finds its origin in the law of
contract and is governed by the usual canons of
construction applicable in the field of contract
law, and that contributory negligence finds its
origin in the law of torts and is governed by its
cardinal canons, and that both defenses 1nay arise
from the same set of circwnstances, though they
do not necessarily do so, we ought to be able to
deal with them without confusion.' Therefore
we are -confirmed in our opinion that under the
facts of this case the court committed no error
in failing to give in charge to the jury the la'v
of assumption of risk as the defendant contends."
The defendant did not plead the defense of assump-tion of risk. Defendant contends that it was not necessary to plead assumption of risk because the elements
thereof were proven by plaintiff in her own case. In
this connection defendant has quoted from the evidence
at great length, both under Point II and Point III in
his brief. The plaintiff testified:
'' Q.

But it was west of the table so it left a very
narrow passageway for you to get between
the bucket and the table. Is that correct~

A.

Well, it didn't obstruct the passageway.
There was plenty of room. I had no thought
of not being able to get through. The walk
was wide enough to go through.

Q.

You thought it was wide enough to get
through~
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. A..

Q.

Oh, there "~a8n 't anything to make me feel
that there ,,~as no roo1n to get by because
there \vas room to get by ( Tr. pp. 96, 97).
* * * *
~Irs. Baker, you said the canvas wasn't
folded like it is shown in the Exhibit 1 which
:L\Ir. Richards showed you. Is that correct~

A.

That's right, it \vasn 't folded like that.

Q.

Did you observe whether it was folded at

. A..

Well, I couldn't say as to that. I know it
wasn't smooth, and I had to step over it. It
was uneven, and I felt that it was bunched
at the end of the table, though, just crumpled
up and bunched there, and I did step over
with my left foot and caught my right heel in
it, and it was held down by the table and
didn't give, and it threw me down.

all~

Q. And you observed that condition before you
stepped overA.

I did.

Q. -with your left

A.

foot~

Well, I was w·alkimg night along the hallway
on my way out to go bo w·ork as I always do,
·and I had no hesit:anc.IJJ 1ab out it beoause: it
seemed perfectly all right, I could step over
that. ( Tr. pp. 190, 191). '' (Italics ours)

From the testimony it is apparent that plaintiff
did not appreciate any danger or extraordinary hazard in
traversing the hallway. For the doctrine of assumption
of risk to be applicable, one must have knowledge and
appreciation of the danger.
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It is stated in 38 Am. Jur. p. 847, Sec. 173, "Knowledge and appreciation of the danger is an essential of
the defense of assumption of risk.'' Likewise, in the
case of J(uchenmeiister v. Lo:s Angeles & S. L. R. Co.,
52 Utah 116, 172 P. 725, at page 729, the court states:
''The distinction is also very intelligently
discussed and clearly stated by the author in 3
Labatt Mast. & Serv. Sec. 1219· et seq. The fundamental element in assumption of risk, where it is
not assumed as a rna tter of con tract, as stated in
the foregoing quotation, is 'intelligent choice';
that is, the employe, before he may be charged
with having assumed the risk, must not only have
fully understood and appreciated the danger,
but he, in the very face of the danger, must, voluntarily, have assun1ed the risk of injury. N othing short of that constitutes intelligent choice.''
Neither under the pleadings nor the evidence was
defendant entitled to an instruction involving the question of assumption of risk. The defendant also failed to
submit to the court a proper request for this defense
even if it was proper under the pleadings and the facts
of the case. This question we will discuss under our
heading number 5.

4.

THE PLAINTIFF WAS NOT GUILTY OF
CONTRIBUTORY NEG·LIGENCE AS A }fATTER OF LAW.

Defendant contends that if he was negligent and the
passageway was hazardous, the plaintiff was guilty of
contributory negligence in failing to have observed the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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condition. Plaintiff did testify that she noticed that the
cleaning had been started in the hall and that the canvas
was rumpled at the end (Tr. p. 93). There is no evidence
that after observing these facts she carelessly hurried
down the hall or failed to proceed with caution (Tr. p.
190). ·The only other claim is that

th~re

was another exit

available, which plaintiff failed to take. This court in
the case of

Moo.~e

v. Miles, supra, held that such facts

do not constitute contributory negligence as a matter of
law, and the question of contributory negligence should
be submitted to the jury.
''The next question for consideration is
whether plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law in proeeeding down the
darkened hallway knowing that the stairway was
at the end thereof. In this jurisdiction we are
committed to the doctrine that the question of
·contributory negligence is one for the jury, where
as said in C:arpenter v. Syrett, 99 Utah 208, 104
P. 2d 617, 619, 'different conclusions may be reasonably drawn by different minds from the same
evidence * * *.' See also, Olsen v. Hayden Holding C·o., .supra; Jensen v. Logan City, 89 Utah 347,
57 P. 2d 708; Shortino v. Salt Lake & Utah R. R.
C·o., 52 Utah 476, 174 P. 860; Larkin v. Saltair
Beach Co., 30 Utah 86, 83 P. 686, 3 L.R.A., N.S.,
983, 116 Am. St. R.ep. 818; Hone v. Mammoth Min.
Co., 27 Utah 168, 75 P. 381; Smith v. Rio Grande
Western Ry. Co., 9 Utah 141, 33 P. 626. And from
other jurisdictions L'Heureux v. Hurley, 117
Conn. 347, 168 A. 8; Sodekson v. Lynch, 314 Mass.
161, 49 N.E. 2d 901; Armstrong v. Yakima Hotel
Co., 75 Wash. 477, 135 P. 233."
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5. THE

TRIAL

COURT CORRECTLY INST~UCTED THE JURY AS TO THE
THEO·RY AND L·AW OF THE CASE.

Defendant claims that the court fully instructed the
jury as to plaintiff's theory of the case but failed to
instruct the jury on defendant's theory of the case as
requested. It is true that the court did instruct the jury
in accordance with plaintiff's pleadings and, as· we contend, in accordance with the evidence introduced. What
was defendant's theory~ From the pleading there are
no specific grounds of contributory negligence alleged,
nor did he :plead the defense of assumption of risk.
The court fully instructed on the question of contributory
negligence by its instructions numbers ·5, 6 and 8 (Tr.
p:p. 32-33). Defendant then contends that the court committed error because it did not give defendant's requested instructions numbers 6, 8 and 9. The court was
justified in refusing to give instruction number 6 because that instruction does not state the law. The instruction reads as follows :
''You are instructed that Mrs. Baker in traversing the hallway of the apartment was not
relieved of the necessity of exercising ordinary
care for her own safety. If you find that the defendant's equipment was placed in the halhvay
in such a manner that it constituted a hazard
which plaintiff under the circumstances should
have observed and that plaintiff, notvvithstanding the fact that other exits were available to
her, proceeded to take the hazardous course, then
you must find that she assumed the risk of any
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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injury '\vhich she sustained and your verdict shall
be in favor of the defendant Jansen, no cause
of action.~' (Tr. p. ±5).
This instruction is erroneous even if the evidence
and pleadings "\Yere such as to permit it, which we contend they were not, for by the instruction the jury was
instructed that if plaintiff observed that the hallway was
hazardous and she still eontinued to take the hazardous
course rather than another exit which was available
to her their verdict must be in favor of the defendant.
Under the law, if the principle of assumption of risk
was involved in this case, the question should have been
left to the jury to determine whether or not she assumed the risk by going over the hazardous passageway
rather than using one of the other exits. Likewise 1n
defendant's requested instruction number 8 which is
as follows:
"If you find that the defendant's equipment
was placed in the hallway in such a manner that
it constituted a hazard and that plaintiff observe-d, or in the exercise of ordinary care should
have observed such hazard, then you are instructed that plaintiff was negligent in not taking either the east or south stairways which were
available to her and your verdict shall be against
the plaintiff and in favor of the defendant Jansen, no cause· of action. " (Tr. P·· 47) .
the jury was instructed that plaintiff was negligent
in not taking either the east or south stairways which
were available and that the verdict should he against
her. This is the very question that should have been
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left to the jury to determine. As stated in the case of
Mo:ore v. Miles, supra, this court held that it was not
negligence as a matter of law for the plaintiff to have
proceeded down the dark hall, but it was for the jury
to determine whether an ordinarily cautious person
should have known that it was imprudent to have chosen
the unsafe route when another and welllight€d stairway
was available.
There was no instruction requested by the defendant that would have submitted to the jury the question
whether it was negligence for plaintiff to proceed along
the hallway to the front stairs rather than to take either
the side or back stairs to the next :floor. A party cannot claim that the jury was not properly instructed upon
a point in question unless the p-arty makes a request to
the court for such an instruction, or excepts to the court's
failure to instruct on the particular point. 81J)tlbon v. Otis
Elev~at~or Co., 68 Utah 85, 249 Pac. 437.
Defendant's requested instruction number 9 (Tr. p.
48) was given in part by the court's instructions numbers 5 and 6 ( Tr. p. 32). There is no evidence to support
the contention that plaintiff was negligent in the manner
in which she passed or attem,pted to pass by or over the
equipment, and the court was justified in not including
that element in its instructions to the jury. The court
did instruct the jury in its instructions numbers 5 and 6
that plaintiff must use ordinary care for her own safety
before she was entitled to recover, and then instruction
number 8 clearly defined "ordinary care".
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6. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NUMBER 4, NOR DID
THE COURT ERR IN IN'STR.UCTING THE
JURY O·RALL.Y AND THEN STRIKING A
P .A.RT THEREOF FROM SAID WRITTEN
INSTRUCTION.
Instruction number 4 as originally given to the
jury is set out at length on page 47 of defendant's brief.
After the court had read the instructions to the jury and
the jury had retired to deliberate ( Tr. p. 197), the defendant excepted to instruction number 4 and the whole
thereof, ''and particularly orally instructing the jury
at the end of the said instruction'', as indicated in the
portion of the instruction number 4 italicized (Tr. p·.
198). The record is not clear as to what the defendant
meant in his exception by the court having ''orally'' instructed the jury at the end of said instruction number
4, but when the exception was taken, the court offered to
recall the jury and to read instruction number 4 ''as
deleted'' ( Tr. p. 198). This offer was refused by the
defendant (Tr. p. 199). Instruction number 4 (Tr. p. 32)
shows that ink lines were drawn through the italicized
portion of the instruction as it is quoted on page 47 of
defendants' brief, and this was apparently done after the
court had read the entire instruction to the jury, but before handing the instructions to the bailiff for delivery
to the jury in the jury room, as the court state, ''I
thought it would be better not to reread it to them,
thereby giving emphasis to it. I struck it fron1 the written one, but if you desire at this time I will recall the
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jury and read that to them as it is now written." (Tr.
p. 198)
0

Defendant now complains about instruction number
4 chiefly on the ground that the instruction indicates
absolut·e liability when considered without the portion
deleted by the court. We submit that the instruction as
originally written was entirely proper and that where
the defendant has particularized in connection with his
exception and the court having acted in response thereto,
he cannot be heard to complain about the instruction construed without the portion deleted. But, in any event,
we do not subscribe to the contention that the instruction
as finally given can he construed as defendant claims.
The word ''if'' is used in the instruction and when given
full meaning leaves to the jury the determination of
whether or not the defendant was negligent as claimed.

There being no prejudicial error, the verdict of the
jury and the judgment entered thereon should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

GUS·TIN & RICHARDS,
BRENT T. LYNC·H, JR.
Attorneys for Respond-

ent.
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